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In January 2004, highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) virus of the H5N1 subtype was first confirmed in
poultry and humans in Thailand. Control measures, e.g.,
culling poultry flocks, restricting poultry movement, and
improving hygiene, were implemented. Poultry populations
in 1,417 villages in 60 of 76 provinces were affected in
2004. A total of 83% of infected flocks confirmed by labora-
tories were backyard chickens (56%) or ducks (27%).
Outbreaks were concentrated in the Central, the southern
part of the Northern, and Eastern Regions of Thailand,
which are wetlands, water reservoirs, and dense poultry
areas. More than 62 million birds were either killed by HPAI
viruses or culled. H5N1 virus from poultry caused 17
human cases and 12 deaths in Thailand; a number of
domestic cats, captive tigers, and leopards also died of the
H5N1 virus. In 2005, the epidemic is ongoing in Thailand.
H
ighly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is a devastat-
ing disease in poultry; it is associated with a high
death rate and disrupts poultry production and trade (1,2).
HPAI viruses may be transmitted from birds to humans
(3,4), and they are a potential source of future human
influenza pandemics (5). HPAI outbreaks were relatively
rare until 1990 but occurred in many countries in the last
decade (1). In Asia, since the HPAI H5N1 epidemic in
Hong Kong in 1997, HPAI viruses have been isolated con-
tinuously through routine surveillance in Hong Kong (6,7),
South Korea (8), and China (9–11). In Thailand, no evi-
dence of HPAI infection was recorded before 2004 (12). In
2003 and 2004, HPAI H5N1 outbreaks were reported in
several Asian countries (South Korea, Vietnam, Japan,
Thailand, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Laos, Indonesia, China,
and Malaysia) (1,13), and these outbreaks were not easily
halted (11,14). Furthermore, H5N1 viruses crossed from
birds to humans and caused 116 laboratory-confirmed
cases in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia with
60 deaths (as of September 29, 2005) (11,15). We describe
epidemiologic features of the HPAI H5N1 epidemic in
Thailand in 2004, with focus on introduction of the virus,
distribution of disease in Thai poultry, control measures,
and consequences.
Poultry in Thailand and HPAI Virus Introduction
Before 2004, Thailand was among the world’s major
poultry exporters and produced ≈1 billion chickens per
year (16); >400,000 persons were employed in the poultry
industry (17). Aside from commercial hybrid broilers and
layers, backyard poultry are raised for food in most vil-
lages (18) (Table 1). The poultry population is concentrat-
ed in the Central and Eastern Regions of Thailand
(Figure 1). Table 2 categorizes Thai poultry production
into 4 sectors on the basis of farm management, biosecuri-
ty, and market orientation (14).
In late 2003, poultry farms in the Central and Northern
Regions of Thailand experienced large-scale die-offs
(19–22). Beginning in mid-December 2003, H5N1 out-
breaks were reported in South Korea, Vietnam, and Japan.
Meanwhile, Vietnam confirmed the first human death from
H5N1 (13). In December 2003, a nationwide surveillance
program was initiated to detect human cases in Thailand
(22). Subsequently, the surveillance program was strenu-
ously implemented for poultry in mid-January 2004.
Cloacal swabs were collected from poultry flocks through-
out Thailand, and all samples were tested for avian influen-
za by virus isolation (2) at national and regional
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On January 23, 2004, the Thai national reference labo-
ratory (National Institute of Animal Health [NIAH]) offi-
cially confirmed the presence of an H5 HPAI virus in a
layer chicken farm in Suphanburi Province (13). The route
by which this virus was introduced could not be traced.
The virus was characterized as the H5N1 subtype (13), a
member of the 2000 avian influenza lineage; most of its
genetic sequences were closely related to influenza
A/Duck/China/E319.2/03 (23); it belonged to genotype Z
(11). That same day, the Thai Ministry of Public Health
(MOPH) announced 2 laboratory-confirmed cases of
H5N1 virus in children from Suphanburi and
Kanchanaburi Provinces; the children eventually died
(24,25).
Spread of the Epidemic
The onset of H5N1 human cases (22) showed that the
H5N1 virus was already introduced into Thailand by the
end of 2003 (Figure 2), before the first identification of the
virus. In addition, the 149 reported outbreaks in poultry in
144 villages in 32 of the 76 provinces during the first week
of the epidemic indicated that the virus had been wide-
spread throughout the country. The epidemics in Thailand
took place in 2 distinct periods, January–May 2004
(termed P1 or the first wave) and July–December 2004
(termed P2 or the second wave) (Figure 2). The epidemic
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includes only outbreaks from January to December 2004.
From January to May 2004, HPAI infections were
detected in 188 villages in 42 of 76 provinces throughout
Thailand (Table 3). The outbreaks occurred in all parts of
Thailand but particularly in the Central, the southern part
of the Northern, and the Eastern Regions. The last out-
break of the first wave was reported on May 24, 2004,
from a layer farm in Chiangmai Province (13).
On July 3, 2004, the recurrence of HPAI was confirmed
in layer farms in Ayudthaya and Pathumthani Provinces,
north of Bangkok. These viruses were characterized as the
H5N1 subtype, with genetic sequences similar to the
H5N1 isolated in January 2004 (26). During P2, HPAI
infections were detected in 1,243 villages in 51 provinces
(Table 3), which were concentrated in the same 3 regions
(Figure 3). From July 3 onward, ≈1–5 cases per day were
detected in the first weeks of the epidemic. It reached a
peak of 61 cases per day in mid-October 2004 (Figure 2B).
The geographic distribution of the second wave differs
markedly from that of the first wave, and the number of
confirmed outbreaks was 8 times higher. Most HPAI out-
breaks were found in the Central and Northern Regions
where chicken and duck flocks are relatively more abun-
dant. In the Northern Region, 99% of infected flocks were
detected in the southern part. Figure 3 shows that HPAI
was sporadic in the Southern, the northern part of the
Northern, and the Northeastern Regions, which have a
lower number and density of poultry populations. Figure 2
shows a dramatic increase in HPAI-positive flocks in
January and October 2004, which coincided with the
nationwide surveillance programs implemented at that
time. Also, the number of infected flocks, particularly of
backyard chickens and ducks, increased markedly in these
months (Figure 4).
Type of Poultry Affected
Table 1 shows the various types of poultry in HPAI-
positive flocks in 2004. Eighty-three percent of infected
flocks were backyard chickens (56%) or ducks (27%); the
rest were broilers (6%), layers (5%), quails (2%), and other
birds (3%). From field studies in early 2004, ducks were
determined to be silent carriers of HPAI virus (10,27).
Accordingly, the proportion of infected ducks diagnosed
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Figure 1. Distribution of poultry population in Thailand in 2003.during P2 markedly increased when compared to the num-
ber diagnosed during the early epidemic (P1) because
more samples from ducks were submitted to laboratories.
Figure 4 shows epidemic curves by species; consistent
dissemination of infection was confined to backyard
chickens and ducks. Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of
HPAI-infected poultry by region. More than 50% of infect-
ed flocks were of the backyard type in all regions except
the Central Region (≈40% of infected flocks were back-
yard), which suggests that backyard chickens played a cru-
cial role in the epidemic. However, during P2, 46% of
infected flocks in the Central Region were ducks, which
shows that they also contributed substantially to the epi-
demic. Free-grazing ducks are common in the Central
Region (Table 1), with its abundance of wetlands and rice
paddies. In 102 flocks (6.05%), HPAI was detected in >1
species (mixed farms).
Table 1 also shows cumulative incidence and relative
risk (RR) of HPAI outbreaks. RRs of a flock’s becoming
inflected were 3.7 and 1.3 times higher, respectively, in the
Central and Eastern Regions compared to the Northern
Region. Moreover, risks for HPAI infection were 5.3, 5.1,
1.5, 32.4, and 2.3 times higher, respectively, in layers,
broilers, ducks, quails, and geese compared to backyard
chickens.
Spread to Other Species
In the early epidemic, domestic cats, captive tigers, and
leopards also died from H5N1 viruses, which indicates that
avian influenza can cross species barriers (13,20,25). In
October 2004, the infection of H5N1 viruses was con-
firmed in captive tigers at Sriracha tiger zoo in Chonburi
Province, eastern Thailand (28). A total of 147 of 441
tigers kept in the zoo died or were euthanized to prevent
possible spread to other zoo animals. Fresh chicken car-
casses used to feed the zoo animals, contaminated with
HPAI viruses, were considered to be the most plausible
source of the infection (28).
Control Measures
Basic Control Measures
Several measures were taken after the first isolation of
HPAI virus in January 2004. Initially, all poultry, their
products, feed, bedding, waste, and manure from infected
flocks were destroyed immediately by the veterinary
authorities. Culling infected birds in each flock was gener-
ally completed 1–2 days after the virus was confirmed by
virus isolation (confirmatory diagnosis took ≈2–8 days
after submission of samples). Meanwhile, a restriction on
moving poultry and their products within a 5-km radius
around the infected flocks was enforced by DLD inspec-
tors in collaboration with local police, and control check-
points were temporarily established in these areas.
Moreover, infected premises and equipment were cleaned
and disinfected.
In July 2004, DLD implemented a series of control
measures to enable quick action. Specifically, if the poul-
try death rate in any facility was >10% within a single day,
all birds, their products, and other potentially contaminat-
ed materials had to be destroyed without delay. Cloacal
swabs of affected flocks were then collected for laboratory
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Figure 2. Epidemic curve of the confirmed highly pathogenic avian
influenza H5N1 outbreaks in poultry in Thailand by date of notifi-
cation. A) January–May 2004. B) July–December 2004.confirmation. Subsequently, neighboring flocks were
destroyed immediately or quarantined until H5N1 labora-
tory confirmation. Upon a confirmative laboratory result,
quarantined flocks were culled. Furthermore, movement of
poultry and their products was restricted within a 1- to 5-
km radius around the infected area.
Preemptive Culling
In January 2004, contiguous flocks were preemptively
culled as quickly as possible within a 5-km radius of a con-
firmed outbreak. After July 2004, preemptive culling was
implemented only within a village, within an area of 1 km
around an outbreak, or on suspected farms. This new strat-
egy was adopted because the density of poultry flocks
decreased after the massive culling during P1. Negative
public perception of massive culling was another reason
that this strategy was revised.
Surveillance and Diagnosis
In mid-January 2004, DLD launched a nationwide sur-
veillance program to detect possible HPAI infections in
poultry. Cloacal swabs were randomly collected from 4
flocks in each village (5 birds per flock). Swab samples
were placed in tubes that contained virus transfer medium;
usually 5 swabs were pooled per tube. During P1, >100,000
tubes of swab samples were tested for avian influenza virus.
During P2, ≈130,000 tubes of swab samples and 72,000
serum samples were collected for diagnosis.
Swab samples as well as sick or dead bird specimens
were submitted to NIAH or regional laboratories. All sam-
ples were processed for virus isolation in embryonated
chicken eggs (≈1–2 days) (2); 2 serial passages in embry-
onated chicken eggs were performed before a specimen
was regarded as negative (≈8 days). In January 2004, the
first avian influenza isolate was sent to the University of
Hong Kong to identify the virus and serotype hemagglu-
tinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) antigens. Thereafter,
NIAH itself established the necessary facilities to identify
and serotype virus. Furthermore, real-time reverse tran-
scription–polymerase chain reaction analyses for avian
influenza were used to detect the virus at all laboratories to
reduce the time of diagnosis. Hemagglutination inhibition
(HI) test was used to detect antibodies to avian influenza
virus in serum samples (2).
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Figure 3. Distribution of reported highly pathogenic avian influen-
za H5N1 outbreaks in villages in Thailand, January–May 2004
(188 villages of 193 flocks) and July–December 2004 (1,243
villages of 1,492 flocks).
Figure 4. Infected flocks by day of detection and type of poultry,
July–December 2004. A) Backyard chickens. B) Ducks. A full ver-
sion of this figure, including data for January–May 2004 and for
broilers and layers, is available online from http://www.cdc.gov/
ncidod/EID/vol11no11/05-0608-G4.htmA nationwide comprehensive surveillance program
(known as “x-ray survey”) was implemented October
1–31, 2004. The goal of this survey was to detect HPAI
infection in any village. In close collaboration among the
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, MOPH, and
provincial governors, volunteer public health MOPH
workers and DLD livestock workers searched for and
reported sick and dead poultry in villages. Through the sur-
veillance program, farmers were also persuaded to report
sick or dead poultry in their flocks to authorities.
In 2005, x-ray surveys were implemented continuously
every 6 months. Moreover, commercial poultry flocks
spend ≈8 days waiting for the results of cloacal swab or
blood tests; only if birds are free of the virus will their
owners be allowed to move them to slaughterhouses or
new areas. 
Other Supportive Measures 
Apublic awareness campaign was started to educate the
public on avian influenza and to bolster consumers’confi-
dence that poultry was safe. In addition, the so-called “Big
Cleaning Week” was promoted from March 1 to 7, 2004,
to encourage relevant parties to be aware of HPAI and to
disinfect their facilities, e.g., poultry houses, farm equip-
ment and vehicles, slaughterhouses, and retail markets.
Soaps, detergents, alkalis, acids, aldehydes, chlorine, and
quaternary ammonium compounds were used as disinfec-
tants. Poultry exhibition and cockfighting were prohibited
(since early 2004). A violation of this regulation is subject
to fine. Additionally, the practice of allowing ducks to
freely graze was discontinued. Because of traditional farm-
ing styles, however, these practices are unlikely to change
in a short period of time. After an affected flock was
culled, a wait of >60 days in broiler farms and >90 days in
layer farms and backyard chickens was imposed before a
new flock could be established. Farmers must also
improve sanitary measures in their farms to meet DLD’s
requirements.
Consequences of Epidemic
In early 2004, lack of information and communication
with regard to HPAI caused the public to lose confidence
in poultry products. The decrease in domestic consumption
and bans on Thai poultry products by importing countries
damaged the poultry industry. In addition, H5N1 virus
from poultry caused 17 human cases with 12 deaths in 12
provinces (Figures 2 and 3) (15,22).
The Thai government used a stamping-out policy to
control HPAI outbreaks and compensated farmers for their
losses. According to the Animal Epidemic Act, farmers are
entitled to compensation of 75% of the value of animals
that are destroyed. However, 100% compensation was pro-
vided during P1 because the epidemic was widespread and
devastating to Thai farmers; compensation was reduced to
75% during P2. Compensation per bird was (in US dollars)
$0.38–$65, depending on the type of poultry ($0.38 for
quail; $1.13 for broiler; $2 for meat duck; $2.25 for back-
yard chicken; $3.5 for layer chicken, layer duck, or goose;
$7.25 for turkey; and $65 for ostrich).
Approximately 62 million birds were either killed by
H5N1 viruses or culled for disease control and animal wel-
fare reasons. The government allocated a budget of ≈5.3
billion Thai baht (US $132.5 million) for direct compensa-
tion to affected farmers (29). All costs of implemented
basic measures were covered by the government. As of
March 2004, the HPAI epidemic had an estimated effect on
the national gross domestic product of 0.39%. These losses
amount to 25.24 billion Thai baht (US $631 million) (30).
Conclusions
Detection and Early Distribution of HPAI Virus
Epidemiologic data from the early epidemic indicate
that the period between the introduction of the virus into
Thailand and its conclusive identification was too long.
The route of virus introduction could not be traced. Also
the delay between primary infection, first diagnosis, and
finding the initial case allowed widespread dissemination
of the virus and contributed to the large scale of the epi-
demic (31,32). Early warning, early detection, and early
response are essential to prevent and control HPAI. In view
of potential public health implications of HPAI, notifying
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Figure 5. Percentage of main poultry types in infected flocks by
region during the 2004 HPAI H5N1 epidemic in Thailand.
A) January–May 2004. B) July–December 2004.and collaborating with public health authorities is equally
important.
Geographic Regions, Affected Species, and Incidence
The epidemic differed by region. The Central and
Northern Regions contained 82% of the total outbreaks
(Table 1). Infections were prominent in backyard chicken
flocks in the southern part of the Northern Region and in
free-grazing ducks in the area adjacent to the Central
Region. Backyard chickens and free-grazing ducks played
essential roles as H5N1 hosts (Figure 4); 83% of con-
firmed flocks were backyard chickens or ducks. Because
of improved surveillance during P2, disease detections
increased markedly (Figure 2). The difficulty of clinically
detecting HPAI in ducks (27,33) and free-ranging back-
yard chickens and ducks also made controlling the disease
difficult.
The 2004 cumulative incidence and RR also show a
higher number of detections in the Central, Northern, and
Eastern Regions relative to other parts of Thailand
(Table 1). This finding reflects that the high density of
poultry, the local geography (e.g., wetlands, water reser-
voirs, and rice paddies), and farming practice in these
regions might be risk factors for outbreaks. Other studies
showed a strong association between free-grazing duck
populations and the practice of free-grazing farming with
spread of the virus in the Central Region (M. Gilbert et al.,
pers. comm.). In our exploratory analysis, the RR for HPAI
infection in Thai poultry production could not be clearly
elucidated. The RR for HPAI infection was high in broil-
ers, layers, quails, geese, and ducks compared to backyard
chickens (Table 1). The number of detections in these
types of poultry increased substantially in backyard chick-
ens and ducks when national surveillance was implement-
ed in January and October 2004. This observation suggests
that when larger-scale farmers observed suspected cases in
layer and broiler farms, they immediately reported them to
local authorities, encouraged by the compensation that
they received. In contrast, small farmers most likely did
not report their few dead poultry. Consequently, the num-
ber of outbreaks in small farmers may have been underes-
timated. Additionally, size of flock may be a confounding
factor in the higher risk for infection in broiler, layer, and
quail flocks (34,35). 
Course of the Epidemic
The epidemic curve during P1 shows a steep rise in the
first week; detections decreased sharply after control
measures were taken (Figure 2A). In the early epidemic,
samples of culled flocks were not tested during massive
culling. Undoubtedly, the quantity of infected flocks was
underestimated, thus obscuring the effectiveness of control
measures to stem the outbreaks. High numbers of HPAI
detections coincided with low temperatures in Thailand
from October to February, when wild birds from central
and northern Asia migrate into Thailand (7). Therefore,
seasonal conditions and bird migration might have con-
tributed to the introduction of HPAI virus. Furthermore,
the lower temperature supports survival of the virus in the
environment and facilitates transmission (33). In addition,
several festivals, which are associated with raising, selling,
and transporting poultry, occurred around the end of the
year. Illegal transportation and cockfighting may have
worsened the HPAI situation. 
Effectiveness of Control Measures
Because of differences and changes to control measures
and surveillance programs during P1 and P2, HPAI out-
break data are difficult to compare. The start of the out-
break was an emergency period, during which
epidemiologic data could not be effectively or completely
collected. However, our results indicate that although sev-
eral measures were implemented in 2004, the epidemic
could not be controlled. HPAI outbreaks can be controlled
rapidly with highly restrictive measures by totally depopu-
lating all poultry in the entire areas in some countries
(6,32,36). However, given that HPAI was widespread in all
parts of Thailand, total depopulation was not a practical
option. But a combination of depopulation with improved
early detection and response practiced during P2, com-
bined with the culling rigor practiced during P1, may be a
realistic option. 
The Thai epidemic shows that the virus continues to
circulate in the country. The immediate challenge is,
therefore, to control avian influenza in free-ranging ani-
mals in rural areas, particularly in backyard chickens and
free-grazing ducks. However, control of outbreaks in
these types of poultry is difficult because of traditional
farming practices. Control could be achieved by improv-
ing biosecurity of poultry farms and changing farming
practices (6,36,37). Meanwhile, educating farmers and
staff on early detection and the basic concepts of biosecu-
rity may be the most critical way to eliminate avian
influenza virus (32). 
Since January 2004, a stamping-out policy has been
used to control avian influenza outbreaks in Thailand; vac-
cination has been not allowed. According to the Office
International des Épizooties Terrestrial Code 2005, 2 broad
vaccination strategies exist, inactivated whole avian
influenza viruses and hemagglutinin expression–based vac-
cines. Thus, vaccination may be worthwhile to consider as
an additional control measure (36). Vaccination significant-
ly reduces excretion of viruses (38,39), which may reduce
viral load in the environment and decrease the risk for
human exposure. However, HPAI infection could become
endemic if vaccination is not managed appropriately (40).
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implement control measures. Meanwhile, comprehensive
veterinary surveillance and long-term control measures are
required (11). The success of HPAI elimination, therefore,
depends on a collaboration of all stakeholders, including
farmers, industries, veterinarians, public health authorities,
academic institutions, media, and the government (36,37).
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